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1. Introduction 
As early as in 1880s, economic relations between European states were characterized by the 
following phenomenon – investment of capital by the economically developed countries into 
economies of underdeveloped and developing countries. This was the result of a long banking 
transformation process, which, due to industrialization, resulted in the capacity of bank capital to 
finance various enterprises in far apart geographic areas. As many as eighty European banks, differing 
in type, size and power, which at the time were the elite of the European, and hence the world banking 
system, expressed their interest in the Balkans. This phenomenon was of great importance for the 
emergence and development of private banks, not only in the newly established Balkan states that were 
just entering the European scene, but also in those areas of the Balkans that still belonged to the great 
Austrian-Hungarian economic market.1 
The economic situation in Serbia, which was struggling for national liberation from the Turkish 
rule during the first decades of 19th century, was such that establishing a credit organization was not 
even remotely possible even though shareholding type banks were necessary for financing 
infrastructural development, particularly the development of the transportation system. The very 
existence of ideas related to the establishment of such institutions was a proof enough that Serbia was 
turning towards the future, which was of an immense importance for a small country undergoing 
difficult transition from an underdeveloped to a developing country, that is to say from a non-industrial 
to industrial civilization. Yet, for a long period of time, the consolidation of the loan-oriented network 
of banks was not possible (be it in the field of economy or communications). Up until early 20th 
century, the entire Serbian banking system was based on a large number of smaller banks and savings-
banks that limited their business operations to granting loans to farmers and merchants. Their 
fragmentation and lack of organization, as well as extremely limited capital base prevented any serious 
action that might have led to faster and more serious engagement in the country’s economic life. It is 
also vital to point out another phenomenon that characterized Serbian banking at the time – namely, 
banks were used as instruments in partisan struggle (especially in smaller towns where the number of 
banks at times equaled the number of political parties, and instead of extending credits to the economy, 
banks engaged in granting loans to voters). Nonetheless, in 1882 Oesterreichische Landerbank, in 
cooperation with Comptoir d' Escompte from Paris, managed to establish the first “daughter bank” in 
Serbia - Srpska kreditna banka (Serbian Credit Bank). Soon, other Austro-Hungarian, German and 
French banks established affiliations or branch offices on the territory of the Serbian Kingdom. At the 
beginning of 20th century, there were 80 private shareholding type banks with total capital of 
approximately 17 million dinars. By the year 1912, the number of banks increased to 187, and the sum 
total of the capital increased to over 51 million dinars. Up until the beginning of the First World War, 
Parisian banks were the most powerful on the Serbian banking scene as they were in control of state 
loans, which enabled them to ensure reciprocal orders by the French heavy armament and railway 
                                                 
1 Andrej Mitrović, Strane banke u Srbiji 1878-1914. politika, progres, evropski okviri, Beograd, 2004, 38-45; isti, 
Mreža austrougarskih i nemačkih banaka na Balkanu pred Prvi svetski rat, in: "Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis", br. 
3-4, Beograd, 1988, 51 – 55; Danica, Milić, Pregled delatnosti stranog kapitala u Srbiji do Prvog svetskog rata, in: 
“Historiski pregled”, Zagreb, br. 2 (1964), str. 94 - 111. 
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material factories from the Serbian suppliers.2 The domination of the French financial capital continued 
even after the year 1918 and lasted till the beginning of the Second World War. 
2. Economic and Financial Situation in Serbia after the First World War 
2.1. The Fate of Foreign Banks and Their Affiliations 
In 1918, the year when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was founded, due to its geopolitical position, it 
represented a link or a bridge between Europe and Asia, Central Europe, Asia Minor and Middle East; 
it was open towards Mediterranean and connected with Black Sea via the river Danube. Such location 
was of importance in Europe of the day not only in terms of foreign politics, but in terms of economy 
as well. A completely new economic area was created, distinguished by size and quality. This was an 
obvious change, i.e. disintegration of an old economic area on the one hand, and adaptation and gradual 
integration of the new one, on the other. Due to numerous political conflicts this change was not 
apparent and was brought about by the war and inflation, which further implied, to say the least, that 
the change did not take place effortlessly or calmly. 
At the same time, Serbia and countries founded on the territory of the former Monarchy regarded 
the changed scope of the market from different standpoints. While for the first the change implied 
quadruple increase of the market (from original 2.9 million inhabitants), for the latter it implied 
decrease of the market from 677 000 km2 to 248 000 km2. According to some historians, this created an 
atmosphere of pride among Serbian citizens since so much became available for them in the domestic 
market, while, on the other hand, Slovenians, Croats and Vojvodinians were unpleasantly surprised by 
the newly limited scope of opportunities domestic market offered. “The self-complacency felt by one 
side and depreciation felt by the other would become the root of many subsequent tensions.”3 However, 
the following fact cannot be overlooked – while they were under the rule of former Monarchy, 
Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina were mainly agrarian countries, yet, in the newly created state, almost 
overnight, they became the most developed areas in terms of economic growth. This particularly 
applied to Croatia, whose relative advantage was most apparent, especially in the field of financial 
capital. To exemplify, around the year 1912, there were 1039 credit institutions in Croatia (their  total 
assets amounting to 131 million golden crowns), whereas the capital of same institutions in Serbia 
amounted to 58 million golden dinars. Hence, it comes as no surprise that, during the first post-war 
years (before 1924), 50% of the entire banking capital in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians 
(the Kingdom of SCS abbreviated) was concentrated in Croatia. That is why Zagreb became the center 
of economic power, i.e. the hub of capital concentration and the most important industrial and 
commercial center, while Belgrade was the center of political and legislative power.4 
Immediately after the Kingdom of SCS was founded, an atmosphere of great economic euphoria 
prevailed on the territory of the entire state, and especially in Serbia. The causes of this elation are to be 
considered inseparable from the general euphoria that sprung forth because of the war victory and 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Rudolf Bićanić, Ekonomske promjene u Hrvatskoj izazvane stvaranjem Jugoslavije 1918, in: "Prilozi za 
ekonomsku povijest Hrvatske", Zagreb, 1967, 83. 
4 Mijo Mirković, Ekonomska historija Jugoslavije, Zagreb, 1957, 312 - 320; Dušan Mišić, Pregled jugoslovenskog 
novčarstva i bankarstva, in: "Nova Evropa", god. 1923, Zagreb, 1923, 347. 
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creation of the new and grand Motherland. This also created an impression of unlimited possibilities in 
the field of economy. At first, the unlimited possibilities did exist in the capital market considering the 
enormous increase in construction industry, particularly in big cities, exploitation of country’s natural 
resources, setting up new industrial enterprises, development of commerce and growing needs for loans 
both on the part of the state and private entrepreneurs. The opinion prevailed that anything that was to 
be built or produced in a country that had been impoverished and ravaged would generate profit. The 
purchasing power of the population was seldom taken into consideration. The chances for enormous 
and fast financial gain were further increased by progressive inflation that was brought about by sudden 
economical prosperity of the country. The value of the capital, which was, in the form of loans or 
credits, invested in setting up various industrial enterprises, constructing residential buildings (rent 
under lease) or renting entire complexes of construction sites, decreased rapidly due to the inflation. 
Simultaneously, former Austrian-Hungarian enterprises and banks were almost sweepingly 
nationalized. However, such unlimited optimism was not grounded since Yugoslav banks did not have 
sufficient funds at their disposal.5  
The inevitable decrease of mainly bank capital was caused by the decrease of the balance total by 
no less than three quarters that took place in the monetary institutions of Slovenia, Croatia and 
Vojvodina. The reason for the decrease was the transition from the Austro-Hungarian crown to the 
Yugoslav dinar as regulated by the Monetary Unification Decree issued by the Kingdom’s Government 
on January 20, 1920. At the time the exchange rate was 4 dinars for 1 Austro-hungarian crown.6 There 
was still a deficit of domestic capital although foreign companies and banks were extensively 
nationalized. In the end, the inevitable happened; through the well-known and well-developed 
Viennese channels, foreign capital, indispensable for initiation of the country’s economic development, 
began arriving to the country once again. 
At the onset of the Kingdom’s economic life, the balance sheet of Serbian banks was in the 
negative when compared to Vojvodinian, Croatian and Slovenian banking sector. Serbia was worst hit 
in the First World War, and hence, the share of its banks in the overall market was 6.69% compared to 
92.31% of the Vojvodinian, Croatian and Slovenian banks.  Small, local monetary institutions were 
numerous in Serbia mainly because the banking system was created in the setting of highly vibrant 
political life. Party strongholds were created all over, even in the field of bank credit operations. The 
numerous local banks were founded by merchants or exchange dealers, who saw a great opportunity for 
making profit in banking. Bank founders were mainly creditors of small farmers, who, at the time, 
                                                 
5 Danica Milić, Privredni položaj Srbije po završetku ratnih operacija, in: ”Srbija na kraju prvog svetskog rata” 
Zbornik radova Istorijski institut SANU, Beograd, 1990, str. 51 - 63.Velimir Bajkić, Naše bankarstvo, in: "Letopis 
Matice Srpske", knj. 313, Novi Sad, 1927, 219-220; Stanko Deželić, Novčani zavodi Kraljevine, in: "Kraljevina 
SHS, Almanah", sv.I, deo III, Zagreb, 1921/22, 122. 
6 Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, II, 13, 18. 1. 1920. - In the explanatory statement of the Government ruling, 
among other, is stated: “By monetary unification further war between crown and dinar has been precluded, and it 
has been prevented that the value crown increases when the value of dinar is on the decrease, and vice versa; 
monetary unification has allowed parallel fluctuation of the two currencies. After this reform, and on condition of 
favorable economic circumstances in the Kingdom, the value of crown and dinar is to gradually, simultaneously and 
correspondently increase toward their prewar value.”; Setting the dinar - crown ratio at 1:4 was a great problem for 
all monetary institutions on the territory of the former Monarchy and caused great dissatisfaction in Croatian and 
Slovenian financial circles who were of opinion that by such exchange rate the value of dinar had been overrated. 
(See: Milan Ivezić, Naše banke, u: "Domovina, Kalendar za 1925", Beograd, 1924, 119; Rudolf Bićanić,  isto, 101)  
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made up the majority of population in Serbia, and that is precisely why the professionalism of small 
provincial banks was on such a low level.7 
The prewar influence of Viennese and Budapest main offices on banks in the north-west parts of 
the Kingdom remained quite strong even after these territories became an integral part of the newly 
created national state. According to some calculations, the share of Austrian and Hungarian banks in 
the Yugoslav banking market immediately after the war was as follows: 40% in Croatia and Slavonia, 
20% in Slovenia, 43% in Vojvodina, and 35% in Bosnia and Herzegovina.8  
2.2. Compliance with the Law on Establishment of Foreign Financial 
Institutions 
After the First World War ended and the Kingdom of SCS was founded, the issue of legal 
regulation of monetary and credit institutions presented itself. Up until then, these operationally diverse 
institutions, in terms of their operations in the money market, were subjected to no legal regulations 
whatsoever. After 1922, only the concession system was established both for credit and joint stock 
institutions, while the freedom to do business remained intact. Such situation resulted in the collapse of 
a number of banking institutions (around the year of 1926), and threatened to jeopardize the country’s 
entire banking system. In order to prevent that, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the 
Kingdom, which had jurisdiction over banks’ and credit institutions’ business activities, attempted to 
take measures toward passing a special law on banks by which their operations would be legally 
regulated.9  
Shareholder-owned banks were almost the sole type of Yugoslav private monetary institutions. 
When speaking of private banking in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it is always in reference to 
shareholder-owned banks since they represented the majority of the country’s credit apparatus, i.e. they 
were the only direct creditors of economic entrepreneurship. In the Kingdom, for as long as it existed, 
no general law on joint stock companies was adopted. In the territory of Serbia, the Kingdom of 
Serbia’s Law on Joint Stock Associations passed in 1896, and amended in 1898, was in force. In 1922, 
application of this law was extended to the territory of Montenegro.10 In the territories that once were 
under the rule of the Monarchy, commercial laws, which also contained legal regulations in relation to 
the activities of joint stock associations, were applied.11 To weaken the autonomy of the companies 
from the above mentioned territories, and in order to prevent possible confusion that might have 
resulted from simultaneous existence of different banking laws, in November 1919, the Council of 
Ministers ruled that all joint stock associations that were being established or were expanding their 
activities to the entire territory of the state, needed to obtain the permission to that effect from the 
                                                 
7 Antonije Tasić, Jugoslovensko bankarstvo između dva rata, in: "Glas CCCLXVI Srpske akademije nauka i 
umetnosti - Odeljenje društvenih nauka”, Beograd, knj. 26 (1992), str.147 -208; Danica Milić, Privredni položaj 
Srbije po završetku ratnih operacija … str. 51 - 63. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry (65), f. 997 – j.o. 
1852. 
10 Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, br. 105, 15. 5. 1922, Zakon o proširenju važnosti Zakona o akcionarskim 
društvima u Kraljevini Srbiji, na teritoriju Crne Gore. 
11 Milorad Zebić, Zakoni i raspisi o akcionarskim društvima s uputstvima i objašnjenjima: Trgovački i mjenbeni 
zakon o društvu dioničarskom i Trgovački zakon za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Beograd, 1925, 73-124. 
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Ministry of Commerce and Industry.12 The Ministry also issued special permissions in cases when joint 
stock associations that were being established were in fact affiliations of foreign companies or banks. 
In 1922, the concession system of establishing banks (and joint stock companies) which was functional 
in Serbia was extended to those Yugoslav territories which practiced normative system of company 
establishment while being a part of Austro-Hungary, and, consequently, shareholder type banks in 
Yugoslavia could be established only under the permission of authorities.13 Even though the Ministry 
had all the preparatory actions in place to pass a special law on banks in order to regulate their 
operations, and at the same time guarantee solvency and liquidity, that law was never passed. 
Thus, the newly founded Kingdom of SCS inherited through its constituents an extensively diverse 
banking system consisting of a large number of mainly smaller-size institutions. In the early years of 
the new kingdom, namely until 1927, the number of banks was constantly increasing. The process of 
establishing new banks was in full swing during 1922, at the height of inflation period. Due to high 
inflation from 1920 to 1923 the stock exchange was characterized by an intensive trading in stocks and 
bonds by economic, especially banking institutions. Profit outlook was great, and, hence, joint stock 
capital of the banks grew. From 1921 to 1924, it increased from 829.8 million dinars to one billion and 
919 million dinars. Such development was largely incited by the general tendency to industrialize the 
country. Not before the collapse of certain banks that occurred in 1926 did the establishing of new 
banks cease. It was then that the number of banks in the Kingdom, and consequently in Serbia, started 
decreasing.14 
Decentralization of the banking system was one of the most significant factors that contributed to 
an extremely high interest rate on the Yugoslav market and presented a serious problem during the 
entire interwar period. In an attempt to decrease the market interest rate (which was, for example, as 
high as 30% in 1922), the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS took measures that implied merging 
of smaller banks and determining the minimum net capital stock that monetary institutions were 
required to have in order to be granted loans from the National Bank. These measures could not have 
yielded significantly positive results, but, nonetheless, by 1930, the process of centralization of the 
banking system had begun (to illustrate, twenty mergers of monetary institutions were recorded from 
1927 to 1935). Furthermore, banking system in Serbia, and even in Belgrade, was also quite 
decentralized, but not so much in the former constituents of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, apart 
from Vojvodina. Because Vojvodinian banking system inherited certain negative features from the 
Hungarian provincial banking, it suffered from hypertrophy of small and weak monetary institutions 
that prevented capital concentration. That is one of the key reasons why the emergence of unitary 
banking in Yugoslavia cannot be traced before the late 1920s.15 
 
                                                 
12 Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, br. 161, 13. 12. 1919. 
13 Antonije Tasić, Jugoslovensko bankarstvo između dva rata…, 147-208; Feliks Kohn, Trgovački i pravni leksikon, 
Osijek, 1937, 16. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Deset godina saveza novčanih i osiguravajućih zavoda Kraljevine SHS, 1919 - 1929, Zagreb, 1929, 19; Privredni 
život Kraljevine SHS in: “Kraljevina SHS. Almanah”, Zagreb, sv. 2, deo IV (1924-1925), str. 248. 
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3. Operations of Foreign Monetary Institutions’ Affiliations and 
Branch Offices in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the World 
Economic Crisis in 1931 
In a state where Parliament dealt more with politics than with social and economic development of 
the country, in which governments were prone to collapse and ministers to replacement, there were 
ample possibilities for foreign industrial and financial capital to intertwine and establish connections 
with state and party leaders, thereby obtaining control over Kingdom’s economic life. At the same 
time, during the 1920s, the new Yugoslav state was putting in efforts to protect its fledgling economy 
from the overpowering foreign influence. It was not the matter of placing domestic capital in the 
position previously held by Viennese or Budapest capital (since domestic capital was not of such 
volume), but of gaining control over banking institutions, which, since their head offices were located 
abroad, tended to evade control by the Yugoslav authorities. However, since domestic capital 
accumulation was insufficient and the ruling elite reluctant to implement economic policy measures in 
the above described political situation, the head offices of foreign banks, in time, resorted to turning 
their branch offices into independent “Yugoslav” banks. Foreign citizens remained the owners of the 
newly established banks, that is to say, they continued as owners of stocks and bonds..16 
The Kingdom’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry was in charge of granting a special permission 
for establishing joint stock associations which were affiliations of foreign companies or banks, that is to 
say, in cases when foreign citizens were among the founders.17 On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Finance did not have a clearly defined fiscal policy stance with regard to either the foreign capital 
invested in the Yugoslav economy, nor with respect to the capital already present in the country in the 
form of affiliates or branch offices.18 Laws on joint stock associations in the territory of the Kingdom 
included regulations referring to branch offices of foreign joint stock associations, while the 
participation of foreign capital in domestic associations, namely those founded under Yugoslav laws, 
was not even mentioned.19 
 
3.1. Setting up Banking and Industrial Consortiums 
As the capital market in Yugoslavia was underdeveloped, banks, mainly those owned by 
shareholders, were the most important channel for providing credits to the economy. For that particular 
reason the shareholder-owned banks should be looked into more attentively in the Yugoslav context 
than in the case of countries with a more developed capital market. 
Industry was more developed in those parts of Yugoslavia that were constituents of the Austrian-
Hungarian Monarchy before the First World War. However, such level of development was not nearly 
                                                 
16 Sergije Dimitrijević, Vladavina stranog kapitala u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, Beograd, 1958, 2 - 11; same, Privredni 
razvitak Jugoslavije od 1918 - 1941, Beograd, 1962, 42; Institut za istorijska pitanja, Uprava za kordinaciju rada 
naučnih instituta, Elaborat o britanskom kapitalu u Jugoslaviji 1918 - 1941, njegova ekonomska, politička i 
obaveštajna uloga, Beograd, 1951, 1- 18. 
17 Feliks Kohn, n.d. 16. 
18 Vladimir Rozenberg, Inostrani kapital u jugoslovenskoj privredi. U bankarstvu, industriji, trgovini, transportu, 
osiguranju i ostalim granama privredne delatnosti, Beograd, 1937, 29.  
19 Milorad Zebić, n.d; see article 91 - 97 Zakona o akcionarskim društvima Kraljevine Srbije iz 1896. with 
amendations from 1898, paragraph 210 - 217 Trgovačkog zakona za Hrvatsku i Slavoniju, as well as paragraph 210 
- 217 Trgovačkog zakona za Vojvodinu. 
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high enough to satisfy the demand for industrial products of the entire newly created state. Serbian 
industry was rather modestly developed, and experienced great progress after the Unification. New 
enterprises were being feverishly set up, and the old ones expanded. Necessary finances were rapidly 
raised from all over. Nonetheless, funds needed for long-term investment were insufficient. Banks, 
especially the larger ones, were forced into making long-term investments from their own relatively 
insignificant funds, but also from short term household deposits. In addition to approving industrial 
loans, banks were also directly involved in the industrial sector..Namely, a number of larger banks 
created an array of industrial enterprises. Even though they were custodians in terms of the liabilities on 
their balance sheets, when it came to their asset operations, they functioned exclusively as commercial 
banks specialized in long-term financing of the economy.20 
Though former Austrian-Hungarian banks had lost their leading economic status during the 1920s, 
they soon managed to secure support form the Western European banks whose capital thus became 
closely connected with the Yugoslav banking industry. This was manifest in two ways: through setting 
up affiliations or partaking in net capital stock of domestic shareholder-owned banks. 
 
Table 1 
Affiliations and Banks in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 192821 




(million dinars)  
Foreign Capital 
Participation 
(million dinars)  
Participation 
(percent) 
Affiliations of foreign 
banks 4 45.8 45.8 100% 
Shareholder type 
banks with Foreign 
Capital Participation  
14 275.8 149.5 54.66% 
TOTAL 18 321.6 195.3 60.72% 
 
In seven out of 14 banks with foreign capital participation, this participation represented less than 
5% of banks’ net capital stock (less than 25% in six banks), while in the remaining ones,  with the 
exception of one bank,  banks with foreign capital participation were in possession of majority block of 
shares (over 75%). In most cases foreign shareholders were foreign banks, other joint stock companies, 
and only rarely natural persons who, in fact, were representatives of foreign enterprises. Nearly ¾ of 
total foreign participation in Yugoslav banks came from foreign banks, while little over 18% originated 




                                                 
20 Vesna Aleksić, The History of the “Allgemeiner jugoslawischer Bankverein AG” in Beograd in the context of 
Yugoslav Banking History after 1918, in: “150 Jahre oesterreichische Bankengeschichte im Zentrum Europas”, 
Bank Austria Creditanstalt, Oliver Rathkolb/Theodor Venus/Ulrike Zimmerl (Hrsg.),  Wien, 2005, 226-238. 
21 Antonije Tasić, Jugoslovensko bankarstvo između dva rata…, 147-208. 
22 Ibid. 
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Table 2 
Foreign Capital Origin23 
The amount in which foreign capital participated  
in Yugoslav banking Capital Origin 
million dinars Percent 
French 41.9 21.42% 
Czechoslovakian  37.5 19.20% 
Austrian (later German) 30.2 15.47% 
Belgian  23.9 12.24% 
Hungarian 16.7 8.53% 
Swiss 10.6 5.36% 
Monaco 10.4 5.33% 
Italian 9.7 4.96% 
English 8.9 4.56% 
Dutch 5.1 2.61% 
Swedish  0.5 0.32% 
TOTAL 195.3 100% 
 
The share of French capital in Serbia amounted to almost 90%, most of which came through the 
French-Serbian bank. Capital of the French origin combined with the capital from other West European 
countries was rarely present in other shareholder-owned banks. This was not the case with the Czech 
capital, which in Yugoslav banks was often combined with Austrian, British or Belgian capital. The 
share of Czech capital in Serbia was approximately 65%.24   
Due to shortage of capital, the development of the capital market in Yugoslavia was not possible. 
Hence, banks were the sole creditors of the country’s economic activity. Instead of obtaining necessary 
funds through stocks and bonds emission, the economy had to turn to drafting loans which monetary 
institutions approved through checking accounts. This situation directly resulted from the country’s 
capital deficiency. Up until 1925, the crediting of economy through checking accounts (generally 
speaking) was on the constant rise. During 1926 and 1927, certain decline was recorded, which can be 
explained by the fact that a number of banks, especially in Serbia, crashed due to their imprudent 
industry ventures. Checking accounts transactions peaked in 1930 when, compared to 1922, they nearly 
doubled.25 
Apart from funds made available to companies through loans (1699.8 million dinars), shareholder-
owned banks supported industry through running their own enterprises (166 million dinars), acquiring 
company stocks (624.8 million dinars) and participating in consortium ventures (209.2 million dinars). 
Thus, the total participation of shareholder-owned banks in the country’s economy amounted to 2 
billion 699.8 million dinars. Taking in consideration that the loans worth 1699.8 million dinars were 
allocated mainly to industrial companies, 85.4% of which were joint stock companies, and that bank-
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Vladimir Rozenberg, Jovan Kostić, Ko finansira jugoslovensku privredu? država - banke - inostrani i domaći 
kapital u službi privrede, Beograd, 1940, 23-27. 
25 Ibid. 
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owned enterprises, as well as those with monetary institutions’ participation, were in most cases 
engaged in industrial production – we may say that the total participation of banks in the industrial 
sector was two and a half billion dinars.26 
 
Table 3 






by private banks 
(million dinars) 
Loans approved 
by private banks 







Wood industry:     
Companies with bank 
participation 453 220 48.1% 117.5 
Other companies 754.3 115.2 15.3% 411.1 
Mining and ironworks 
industry:     
Companies with bank 
participation 115.8 71.9 62.1% 22.4 
Other companies 620.9 145.3 23.4% 341.6 
Chemical industry:     
Companies with bank 
participation 61.1 26 42.5% 14.7 
Other companies 223.3 30 13.4% 47.7 
Food industry:     
Companies with bank 
participation 121.7 74.5 52.6% 15.3 
Other companies 447.2 92.2 20.6% 105.2 
Agro- industry:     
Companies with bank 
participation 32.5 10.6 32.6% ---- 
Other companies 447.2 35.7 31.4% 12.8 
Textile industry:     
Companies with bank 
participation 174.3 22.8 13.1% 72.5 
Other companies 595.2 215.4 36.2% 184.6 
Metallurgy:     
Companies with bank 
participation 449.7 110.5 24.6% 170.1 
Other companies 468.4 21.2 4.6% 86 
Cement industry:     
Companies with bank 
participation 141.5 27.7 20.3% 76.9 
Other companies 369 103.9 28.2% 137.1 
 
                                                 
26 Antonije Tasić, Jugoslovensko bankarstvo između dva rata…, 147-208. 
27 Ibid. 
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Funds invested in wood industry through loans were most substantial (335.2 million dinars), but 
their overall participation in total loan value approved to industrial companies, was the greatest in 
mining and ironworks. Bank loans approved to textile industry were quite substantial as well (238.2 
million dinars). More often than not, banks tended to approve loans to those industrial companies in 
which they had capital investments. Cement and textile industry were the exception, however. In the 
case of cement industry, banks’ participation in its total loan value was 20.3% in companies with bank 
participation, and 28.7% in other companies. In the case of textile industry, the ratio is even higher - 
13.1%: 36.2%.28 
The table shows that foreign capital displayed significant interest in investing in the Yugoslav 
industrial sector. Loans approved by foreign institutions were quite substantial. Majority of industrial 
enterprises were supported by foreign rather than domestic banks’ financial funds. Such was the case 
with mining and ironworks industry, metallurgy and cement industry. In terms of crediting the 
electrical power industry (which is not included in the table), there was an enormous disproportion in 
foreign versus domestic banks’ participation. Namely, out of 485.2 million dinar worth of loans this 
industry had at its disposal, only 24.3 million dinars came from domestic banks, while 408.5 million 
dinars came from foreign sources of finance (remaining 10.4 million dinars came from public credit 
institutions). The participation of foreign institutions was smaller only in case of food and agro-
industry. The investments of public credit institutions (National Bank and two state monetary 
institutions) were more than two and a half times smaller than those of private banks (26.02% : 9.99%). 
Namely, private banks participated with one billion and 699.8 million dinars, or 26.02% of the total 
value of loans approved to mainly industrial companies. Other creditors participated in the following 
manner: National Bank contributed 5.68%, State Mortgage Bank 4.31%, foreign creditors 44.64%, and 
other creditors 19.35%.29 
 
3.2. The Role of Serbian Political and Financial Elite in the Activities of Foreign 
Banks in Serbia  
As has already been observed, legislation on joint stock associations in the Kingdom contained 
regulations that applied to branch offices of foreign joint stock associations, while domestic 
associations in which foreign capital was invested, namely those founded under the Yugoslav 
legislation, were not even mentioned. Aware of this fact, foreign banks’ management structures in the 
1920s opted to transform their branch offices located in the territory of Yugoslavia into domestic joint 
stock associations. The requirement was for a certain percentage of stocks to be in the ownership of 
Yugoslav citizens (usually 50 to 55%), while at the same time at least half of the managers on the 
Board had to be elected from among those same Yugoslav stockholders.  In this way, apart from 
foreigners, who were the actual owners, citizens of Yugoslavia, the so called “štomani”, managed to be 
represented on the management boards. These people were well-connected and quite influential on 
public administration, and through them it was possible to achieve and maintain contact with the most 
important and influential state instances. In exchange for high profit-related management bonuses, and 
without actually participating in bank management, they secured support of the state, or at least the 
support of some members of the ruling elite, in certain business or financial transactions conducted by 
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29 Ibid. 
Foreign Financial Capital as the Catalyst of Serbian Economic Development 
before the Second World War 
Fourth Conference of Southeast Europe Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) 12 
banks across the Kingdom. It is well known that foreign representatives carefully scrutinized all those 
who had any influence on the Serbian economic and political scene, and who could in the best way 
possible, serve their interests. In the years preceding the crisis, dividends paid to stockholders 
amounted to 8%, while in 1932 this percentage was as low as about 2%.30 
The union of banking and industrial capital was realized by having, on the one hand, bank 
managers sitting on management boards of numerous companies, and, on the other, the most prominent 
Serbian industrialists acting as members of management boards of monetary institutions with foreign 
capital participation. In this way, the immense power and control was concentrated in the hands of a 
small number of economic and political state representatives and foreigners who gained significant 
financial, political and social influence in Yugoslavia. Being an integral part of the Kingdom’s urban 
social stratum, which represented a minority at the time, this banking class of economic elite, was 
“merely a drop in the sea of uneducated masses”, was closely linked to West European capital and their 
representatives. They played an important role in modernization of the Yugoslav society, especially if 
one takes into account that bankers had the knowledge without which economic and financial 
development and the overall progress of the society would not have been possible.31 
Affiliates and branch offices of foreign banks, that is to say modern, European mixed-capital type 
banks, were an important moving spirit behind the modernization of the economic and social life in 
Serbia, a country which was in between the traditional and modern worlds during the interwar period. 
Serbian society was also quite incongruous, economically disintegrated, nationally heterogeneous, 
religiously hermetic, and politically polarized. In such circumstances, these influential banks, being 
closely and extensively connected with the country’s life, were in a position to spread, first of all, 
contemporary ideas concerning financial business practices and conducting financial transactions. The 
fact that people of enormous importance, both in the context of the European and world banking, were 
on their boards of managers, also facilitated rapid and successful gaining of respect from some 
prestigious international banks, which were almost unavoidable when it came to investing significant 
amounts of European capital into the Yugoslav and Serbian economy.32  
Foreign-owned banks were also socially important on their own, since, in time, they created a 
specific bourgeois stratum of bankers and bank clerks, who held prominent positions on the social 
ladder, and who were constituents of two, out of three social groups considered to be “promoters” of 
modernization of the Yugoslav society’s in interwar period. In a country in which undereducated and 
unskilled bank clerks were quite common, and in which political affiliation was a key element in social 
promotion, staffing of these banks was an example of an institution’s concern with its own business 
ventures rather than with the politics. As such, they were in a position to spread European 
entrepreneurial spirit and culture, but also to promote West European civilization standards in 
Yugoslavia (and in Serbia as well) - a mainly agrarian country at the time. Simultaneously, however, 
they were under political, economic and social influence of the environment in which they operated, 
especially through domestic clients, but also through local bank clerks.33  
                                                 
30 On methods of foreign branch offices’ transformation into domestic bank see: AJ, General Yugoslav Banking 
Society, Joint-Stock Company Archival Holdings (151) f. 1- j.o. 2. 
31 Vesna Aleksić, Banka i moć, Socijalno-finansijska istorija Opšteg jugoslovenskog bankarskog društva A.D. 1928-
1945, Beograd, 2002, 93-120. 
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4. Economic Situation in Serbia during and after the Financial Crisis 
The Great Crisis of the European banking was brought about by the Great World Economic Crisis, 
caused by the stock market crash in America on October 29, 1929. Namely, since the value of more 
than 40 billion dollar worth of stocks declined, American, mostly short-term loans were recalled from 
Europe, with catastrophic consequences for the European economy. The inability of agricultural, 
mining, industrial and transportation companies to generate standard profits led to extreme 
unemployment rates and deterioration of capacity utilization. The decline in prices of numerous 
primary products (as high as 40 or 50%), stocks of leading industrial companies and co-operatives, and 
stocks and bonds with fixed interest rate resulted in a difficult banking crisis, whose onset in Europe 
was marked by the crash of “mammoth monetary institution” Östereichseche Credit Anstalt fuer Hen-
del und Gewerbe from Vienna.34  
After the First World War, this bank became the symbol of Austrian banking resilience, and 
through its loans controlled 70 – 80% of the Austrian industry and commerce, as well as a significant 
number of industrial companies and monetary institutions in the so called Austrian-Hungarian 
successor countries. Starting from the mid 1920s, half of the bank’s stocks were owned by Anglo-
International Bank Ltd. from London, Schweizerischer Bankverein from Basel and Amstelbank from 
Amsterdam. Already unstable due to the unsuccessful merger with Bodencredit-Anstaltbank from 
Vienna that took place in September 1929, Östereichseche Credit Anstalt fuer Hendel und Gewerbe 
bank suffered further losses in May 1931 amounting to 140 million shillings or one billion and 200 
million dinars, which, to give an example, equaled the value of the total bond portfolio of the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia’s National Bank. In order to maintain the trust of foreign creditors, whose loans were the 
basis of bank business operations, but also to protect Austrian economy, Austrian government and its 
National Bank assumed responsibility of the bank’s financial recovery. The debt which reached one 
billion and 700 million shillings, or 13 600 million dinars, in August that year, put the Austrian state in 
a difficult position. Being a new stockholder of Östereichseche Credit Anstalt fuer Hendel und 
Gewerbe bank, Austrian government decided to withdraw the majority of bank’s financial investments 
from other countries (Yugoslavia being one of them) in which this bank had a number of banking and 
industrial affiliations. Chain reaction that ensued put leading Yugoslav and Serbian private banks in a 
difficult position. This happened as a direct consequence of interconnectedness of the financial, 
industrial and commercial capital and was felt in a similar manner across whole of Europe in the period 
between 1931 and 1935.35 
However, suspension of German reparation payments that took place at the time of the Yugoslav 
currency legal stabilization (1931) prevented National Bank from supporting monetary institutions 
when investors came rushing to their counters. Thus, acute psychological crisis of banks could not be 
neutralized, and consequently turned into chronic, that is to say structural crisis, which in time affected 
almost every private bank in Yugoslavia. We may say that despite numerous legislative interventions 
                                                 
34 Herbert Matis, Oesterreichs Wirtschaft in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Desintegration, Neustrukturierung und 
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on Östereichseche Credit Anstalt fuer Hendel und Gewerbe bank collapse throughout 1931 and 1932; special 
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bez razloga, III, 25, Beograd, 20. 6. 1931, 389. 
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by the state, this crisis was felt during the whole interwar period.36 Namely, it was only in 1937 that a 
certain improvement occurred, yet it was of such limited scope that it was difficult to claim that the 
decrease in the volume of credits approved against checking-accounts had finally stopped. Bearing in 
mind that many banks were very much interested in the fate of their clients, that is to say industrial 
companies in which they had made financial investments, without exaggerating we may say that toward 
the end of the period credit operations of Yugoslav banks decreased to such a degree that they became 
barely existent. Of course, such conclusion holds only if Yugoslav banking is regarded in its totality. In 
the case of top 20 Yugoslav banks, most of which had foreign capital participation, the decrease had 
stopped a year earlier: namely, as early as in 1936, these banks recorded an increase in the volume of 
credits approved against checking-accounts, and in 1937 the level recorded in the last quarter of 1934 
was finally regained.37 
 
4.1. Measures Taken by the National Bank and Yugoslav Government in order 
to overcome the Crisis and Establish Firmer Control over Foreign Capital  
In Yugoslavia, there was no deeper, organic connection between the National Bank, as a central 
monetary institution, and other credit institutions. Special situation in the country did not allow for the 
money issuing institution to become the actual monetary market regulator. One of the reasons why this 
organic connection was not established lies in the fact that the National Bank’s position on crediting 
almost always depended on the currency situation, that is to say, it was almost completely subordinated 
to currency.  
During the interwar period the opinion prevailed that private banks could not rely on the support of 
the National Bank in case of unexpected wave of creditors’ distrust. This thesis is further corroborated 
by the fact that before the end of 1937, the National Bank of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia found itself 
twice in the position of having to provide credits to banks so as to stop the withdrawal of savings 
deposits; however, National Bank did not act in either of the two instances. In 1923, unaided, banks 
managed to withstand the surge of creditors, but not without significant difficulties.   
However, in 1931 the distrust toward banks grew to such an astounding level that banks were 
completely unable to prevent the ensuing damage on their own. Soon, the entire credit system 
organization found itself in the state of utter turmoil, and the National Bank could no longer avoid 
provision of emergency lending, but the volume of loans approved at that time was nowhere near 
sufficient for the banks to overcome the acute stage of the crisis. For that reason the National Bank 
imposed a moratorium on repayments by banks worst hit by the unexpected deposit withdrawal.38 The 
issuing institution, hence, did not guarantee the so called indirect liquidity to credit institutions. What is 
more, by the ruling passed on 8 August 1931, and in order to revoke the extremely high profit margin 
                                                 
36 Antonije Tasić, Kriza jugoslovenskog bankarstva (1931-1941), in: "Glas CCCLXVI Srpske akademije nauka i 
umetnosti - Odeljenje društvenih nauka”, Beograd, knj. 27. (1995), str.141 - 167. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ivo Belin, Kreditna politika Narodne banke i kriza kredita, in: Nova Evropa, Knjiga VIII, br. 11 i 12, 1923, 
Beograd, 538-559; Dušan Plavšić, O sanaciji našeg bankarstva, u: XX vek, God. I, februar 1938, br.2, Beograd, 125-
140.  
Foreign Financial Capital as the Catalyst of Serbian Economic Development 
before the Second World War 
Fourth Conference of Southeast Europe Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) 15 
(of approximately 866 million dinars) on approved yet unused loans, the National Bank significantly 
worsened the already difficult situation for the Yugoslav banks.39 
Once it became clear that it was highly unlikely that banks would be able to maintain liquidity 
during the crisis and continue to function normally, Yugoslav government took measures in order to 
revitalize the country’s credit system organization. Hence, on 22 November 1933, the Bank passed The 
Ruling on the Protection of Monetary Institutions and Their Creditors. Other special rulings followed: 
on protection of credit cooperatives, on monitoring decrease in expenses of banks under protection and 
on maximizing interest rates.40 
According to The Ruling on the Protection of Monetary Institutions which was amended on 23 
November 1934, three different protective regimes were made possible: payment delay, financial 
recovery and non-insolvent termination. Only active banks had the right to delay payment. Passive 
banks had to enter the state of non-insolvent termination; however, among passive banks there were 
also banks whose survival was in the country’s economic interest. They were subjected to financial 
recovery – under favorable and special conditions. Such legal regulation was of an utmost importance. 
Its purpose was dual: in the first place, the regulation was aimed to improve the state of the banking 
system and monetary market in general by supporting banks that were not culpable for the problems 
that befell them, or that played an important role in the country’s economic life and, in the second 
place, such legal regulation was intended to eliminate from the banking system every institution proven 
to be insolvent.41 
From that point on operations of protected banks were under strict government supervision. 
Minister of Commerce and Industry was entitled to order inspection to determine whether the bank was 
active, which was not only the case when protective measures were to be approved, but also while 
payment delay was under way. The Minster had the right to appoint a commissary to survey the 
operations of a protected bank, and in case of financial recovery, old financial claims not exceeding 
40% of the total??? were to be transformed into priority stocks and placed in a special reserve fund. In 
February 1938, the possibility to utilize the right of protection was abolished. Up until that point, over 
360 banks were placed under protection measures . During the same year, ten or so banks voluntarily 
declined previously requested and approved protection, which led to the conclusion that the period of 
stabilization had set in, and so the state representatives once again set about establishing legal basis that 
would regulate the activities of credit institutions. In the period immediately preceding the Second 
World War, the issue of the law on banks (that is to say, legal regulation) came into focus once again. 
Placing banks under state control, as specified by the project, was justified by the errors that had 
previously occurred in banks’ business operations, and due to which the country’s economy and its 
citizens were suffering.42  
However, all of these state interventions, either emergency or systemic, were applied mainly to 
private banks. State banks were never in such difficulties that private banks had to endure – their 
business operations even improved significantly during periods of crisis. Besides, state banks were not 
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many. Postal Saving Bank, which had specific objectives, and State Mortgage Bank, the largest and the 
sole institution specializing in approving mortgage loans, apart from Commerce Fund Mortgage Bank, 
were the only two state banks in Yugoslavia. 
Thus, while the volume of savings deposits at Postal Saving Bank and State Mortgage Bank 
amounted to 738.5 million dinars at the end of 1930, it increased to 2 billion and 632.9 million dinars 
before the end of 1937, that is to say, the total increase was one billion and 894 million dinars or 
356.52%. At the same time, the decrease of savings deposits in private banks was nearly 5 billion 
dinars (it dropped from 10 billion and 294 million dinars to 5 billion and 306 million dinars). 
Evidently, due to the rising distrust, a significant amount of money withdrawn from private banks was 
deposited in state banks. During the banking crisis no new state monetary institution was established 
although in some countries the solution for banking and credit crisis in general was found in 
establishing new credit institutions which were either state-owned or privileged. This leads us to 
conclude that the Yugoslav state did not intend to nationalize the banking system, at least not in the 
near term. Throughout this period, domestic banks in majority foreign ownership continued to finance 
the functioning of industrial companies, but with significantly smaller amounts than was the case in 
1931. Besides, new political and economic situation created by aggressive influx of German financial 
capital from 1938 onward, definitely changed the power balance in the Yugoslav and Serbian  private 
banking.43 
5. Conclusion 
Political changes induced by the events of 1918, in addition to their long-term economic causes, 
led to a sweeping process of economic disintegration and reintegration in Yugoslavia and Central 
Europe. At the same time, these changes were also qualitative in nature since they implied the 
transformation of liberal industrial capitalism into monopolistic capitalism whose main feature was the 
merger of industrial and banking capital into financial capital. Due to the market vacuum created by the 
newly established political borders, industry developed more rapidly then its capital accumulation 
allowed, so, in order to satisfy the needs of the existing consumers who, in the past, were a part of the 
Austro-Hungarian market, it had to resort to foreign capital. Private banks in majority foreign 
ownership provided the Yugoslav industrial sector with the necessary funding, and simultaneously 
created banking and industrial consortiums which represented the typical form of capital concentration. 
In the historiography of the postwar Yugoslavia, up until its dissolution, a non-valid conclusion is 
drawn on the power of foreign capital in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia because it is based solely upon 
data concerning the volume of capital directly invested in monetary institutions or industrial 
companies. In fact, the actual influence of major international capital was much more significant then 
data on the net capital stock volume might indicate. The paper shows that private banks in majority 
foreign ownership influenced not only financial market, but the industrial sector as well. The 
development of industry in all agrarian countries, Serbia being one of them, depended upon the import 
of machinery, technical equipment and raw materials, which necessitated substantial funding. Due to 
the lack of domestic capital, foreign investment was necessary. However, as a general rule, foreign 
capital prevented accumulation of capital in the Kingdom by taking the profits (in the form of 
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dividends, entrepreneurial profit and loan interest) out of the country. Industrial consortiums comprised 
of several industrial companies, through their joint stock capital and the use of loans were in fact 
dependent on banks, that is to say foreign capital that controlled them. In such a way, political 
influence was often practiced through economic matters, and beginning with 1938, political influence 
turned into direct pressure. 
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